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Before:   SCIRICA, FUENTES and JORDAN, Circuit 
Judges. 
 
(Filed March 1, 2011) 
_______________ 
 
Lon Taylor   [ARGUED] 
Office of Public Defender 
25 Market Street 
Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex 
Trenton, NJ   08626 
        Counsel for Appellant 
 
Steven E. Braun [ARGUED] 
Office of County Prosecutor 
401 Grand Street  
Paterson, NJ   07505 
        Counsel for Appellees 
_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
Henry Adamson, a New Jersey prisoner convicted in 
1998 of holding up a pool hall and robbing its patrons, 
appeals from an order of the United States District Court for 
the District of New Jersey denying his petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus.  Adamson claims that his constitutional right 
to confront witnesses was violated when, at trial, the 
government introduced confessions of his alleged 
accomplices for the purpose of impeaching Adamson‟s 
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testimony that his own confession had been fabricated by a 
police officer.  Because admission of the accomplices‟ 
statements without a limiting instruction was contrary to 
clearly established Supreme Court precedent, we will reverse 
the District Court‟s decision and grant Adamson‟s habeas 
petition. 
 
I. Factual Background and Procedural History 
 
 A. Factual Background 
 
In the early morning of December 14, 1996, several 
masked and armed men entered Brother‟s Candy Store, a pool 
hall and social club in Passaic, New Jersey, and robbed 
several patrons.  A police officer arriving at the scene saw 
three men flee in one direction, and two flee in another.  The 
officer pursued the latter two and ultimately apprehended one 
of them, Darren Napier.  When the officer returned to 
headquarters with Napier, he recognized the second man he 
had chased from the robbery scene, Gaumaal Aljamaar,
1
 in a 
holding cell.  Both Napier and Aljamaar provided statements 
to the police (the “accomplice statements”), which detailed 
their involvement in the robbery and implicated Adamson.  
 
Three days later, Adamson received a call from his 
girlfriend, Yvette Robinson, whose car had been used in the 
robbery.  She informed him that the police were going to 
                                              
1
The Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division 
(“Appellate Division”) and the State‟s brief employ the 
spelling “Aljamaar,” the trial transcript uses “Aljaamar,” and 
Adamson‟s brief uses the spelling “Aljmaar.”  We adopt the 
Appellate Division‟s spelling of the name. 
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charge her with conspiracy to commit robbery and that they 
were looking for him.  Adamson then surrendered himself 
peacefully to the police.  After waiving his Miranda rights, he 
gave a statement to Detective Julius Cirelli, which, like 
Napier‟s and Aljamaar‟s statements, was transcribed.  
According to Detective Cirelli, he took Adamson‟s statement 
by asking questions and typing Adamson‟s answers on a 
computer.  Adamson‟s statement described the planning and 
execution of the robbery.  It detailed how and where he and 
his co-conspirators met to plan the robbery, the number and 
types of guns used in the robbery, the attempt by one co-
conspirator to back out of the robbery, and the step-by-step 
execution of the robbery, including specifics such as who 
went into the club first, who held which gun, who hit a patron 
with a shotgun, who took jewelry and money from patrons, 
and how the assailants disposed of their weapons.  After 
giving his statement, Adamson read a printed version of it, 
initialed each answer in it, and signed it.   
 
Adamson was later indicted for numerous offenses 
related to the robbery.  He was tried in the New Jersey 
Superior Court, separately from his co-conspirators, and his 
confession was admitted against him at trial through 
Detective Cirelli‟s testimony.  Because the patrons of 
Brother‟s Candy Store could not identify the masked robbers, 
the confession was key to the prosecution, and Adamson 
attacked its validity, testifying on direct examination that it 
was false.  He claimed that Detective Cirelli had threatened to 
charge his girlfriend if he did not confess, that he signed the 
confession but never read it, and that the details in it came 
from the written statements of Napier and Aljamaar, which 
were provided to Adamson before he made his own 
5 
 
statement.  He also claimed that Detective Cirelli supplied 
additional details that were included in the confession.     
 
During cross-examination at trial, the prosecutor 
attacked Adamson‟s testimony regarding the motive for and 
content of his confession.  The prosecutor began by clarifying 
Adamson‟s position on the accomplice statements:  
 
 Prosecutor: Now, you said during your direct 
testimony that you were given 
two other statements to read prior 
to giving [your] statement.  Is that 
right? 
 
Adamson: Yes. 
 
Prosecutor: And that‟s your testimony.  That‟s 
how you knew these details.  Is 
that what you‟re trying to tell us? 
 
Adamson: Yes. 
 
Prosecutor: Whose other statement 
specifically was it that you were 
given? 
 
Adamson: Aljamaar and Darren Napier. 
 
*** 
 
The Court: You read those statements? 
 
Adamson: Yes. 
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The Court: Before you gave your statement. 
 
Adamson: Yes. 
 
(App. at 78.) 
 
The prosecutor then marked the accomplice statements 
for identification and began to impeach Adamson by 
questioning him on the differences between them and his 
confession.  In the colloquy that followed, the prosecutor 
recited and paraphrased significant portions of the accomplice 
statements.  Importantly, those portions not only highlighted 
the differences between the accomplice statements and 
Adamson‟s confession, they also directly implicated 
Adamson in the robbery, as the following cross-examination 
excerpts demonstrate:  
 
Prosecutor:  You used the four door green 
colored Acura in your girl friend‟s 
name? 
 
Adamson: I didn‟t use no car for the robbery. 
 
Prosecutor: That‟s what Mr. Napier says? 
 
Adamson: In his statement, yes.  
 
    *** 
 
Prosecutor: [Mr. Napier] says that … you had 
the small handgun [at the pool 
hall] … . 
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Adamson: That‟s what he said.  
 
     *** 
 
Prosecutor: [I]n [Mr. Aljamaar‟s] statement 
he says that you have a friend that 
goes to the pool hall in Passaic … 
and the people inside have a lot of 
money. 
 
Adamson: That‟s what he said in his statement, yes. 
 
Prosecutor: He said you started thinking this 
was a good place to hit.  Is that 
right? 
 
Adamson: That‟s what he said, yes. 
 
    *** 
 
Prosecutor: [Mr. Aljamaar] said that you had 
a nine millimeter handgun [at the 
pool hall] … . 
 
Adamson: Yes. 
 
Prosecutor: All right.  [Mr. Aljamaar] further 
said that you and General[, 
another alleged accomplice,] were 
going to walk around to see how 
many people were inside the pool 
hall.  That‟s what he said? 
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Adamson: That‟s what he says, yes. 
 
Prosecutor: And he further stated that you and 
General came back and said that 
there were between nine to twelve 
people inside the pool hall and 
that you said let‟s do it.  That‟s 
what [Mr. Aljamaar] said? 
 
Adamson: I need to see that because I don‟t 
remember that part. 
 
Prosecutor: Okay.  Look to the fifth line down, page 
2 of Mr. Aljamaar‟s statement.  
  
Adamson: Then, they said let‟s do it. 
 
(App. at 81-82.)  Adamson did not object to the use of the 
accomplice statements by the prosecutor on cross 
examination. 
 
During closing argument, the prosecutor focused on 
the inconsistencies between Adamson‟s confession and the 
accomplice statements, arguing that those inconsistencies 
showed that Adamson‟s story about his confession being 
based on the accomplice statements could not be believed.  
The prosecutor also criticized Adamson‟s claim that the 
police fabricated the confession, wondering aloud, “if 
Sergeant Cirelli was trying to get [Adamson] to fabricate, 
why [would he] not pick one of the statements and follow it 
to the T, follow it by the letter?”  (App. at 87.)  The 
prosecutor then drew the jury‟s attention to how Adamson‟s 
confession was consistent with the account of events given by 
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some of the victims and officers.  The conclusion pressed by 
the prosecutor was that the “statement … given by Henry 
Adamson ... clearly and unequivocally establishes his 
involvement and his guilt in this particular offense.”  (App. at 
88.)  Adamson did not object to the use of the accomplice 
statements during closing arguments.  
 
The day after closing arguments, the Superior Court 
instructed the jury.  At no point did the Court provide an 
instruction to the jury limiting consideration of the 
accomplice statements to impeachment purposes or otherwise 
preventing the jury from considering those statements for 
their truth, nor did Adamson seek such an instruction.  The 
jury found Adamson guilty on all counts except for attempted 
murder, and the Court sentenced him to a term of life 
imprisonment with a consecutive ten-year sentence and a total 
of thirty years of parole ineligibility.   
 
 B. Procedural History 
 
  1. Direct Appeal 
 
Adamson appealed his conviction and sentence to the 
Superior Court Appellate Division.  On appeal, he asserted, 
among other things, that the government‟s use of the 
accomplice statements during his cross-examination violated 
his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses, especially 
since no limiting instruction was given to the jury.  In an 
October 5, 2000 opinion, the Appellate Division rejected that 
challenge, explaining that “[a]n accomplice‟s out-of-court 
statement may be used for a purpose other than proving the 
truth of what it asserts without violating a defendant‟s right of 
confrontation.”  (App. at 52 (quotations omitted).)  In so 
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holding, the Appellate Division relied on the United States 
Supreme Court‟s decision in Tennessee v. Street, in which the 
Supreme Court approved the use of a co-conspirator‟s 
statement to impeach a defendant who claimed that his own 
statement to police was fabricated and based upon the co-
conspirator‟s.  471 U.S. 409, 413-14 & 417 (1985).   
 
Although a limiting instruction had been given in 
Street to prohibit the jury from considering the co-
conspirator‟s statement for its truth, id. at 414-15, the 
Appellate Division in Adamson‟s case decided that, although 
Street applied, the lack of a limiting instruction was not fatal 
to Adamson‟s conviction.  “While we agree that a limiting 
instruction should have been given,” the Court said, “we 
nevertheless conclude [that] its omission did not constitute 
plain error.”  (App. at 53.)  The Appellate Division explained 
that Adamson‟s failure to request such an instruction at trial 
weakened his case on appeal and required that he show it was 
plain error not to give the instruction.  The Appellate Division 
then said it was “satisfied” that the trial court did not plainly 
err because, “beyond a reasonable doubt, … the error did not 
lead the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached”: 
 
The issue concerning the validity of 
[Adamson‟s] confession, whether it was his or 
one dictated by Detective Cirelli, was clearly 
before the jury.  The unobjected to cross 
examination by the State which revealed 
portions of the contents of the statements did 
not prejudice [Adamson,] given his insistence 
that Cirelli used the statements to formulate his 
confession.  The record is more than adequate 
to support a determination on the part of the 
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jury that the defense raised by [Adamson] was 
simply not credible. 
 
(App. at 54.)  Thereafter, Adamson filed a petition for 
certification with the Supreme Court of New Jersey, which 
was denied, as was his subsequent petition for certiorari to the 
United States Supreme Court.   
 
  2. Post-Conviction Relief  
 
Adamson sought and was denied post-conviction relief 
in the New Jersey state courts.  He subsequently filed a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254, in the District Court, arguing that he was entitled to 
habeas relief because the use of the accomplice statements 
during his cross-examination, without a limiting instruction to 
the jury, violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment.
2
   
 
 The District Court concluded that the Appellate 
Division‟s ruling was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable 
application of Street.  The thrust of the Court‟s analysis was 
that Adamson‟s case is factually indistinguishable from Street 
and thus, as in Street, the State‟s use of the accomplice 
statements for impeachment purposes did not run afoul of the 
Confrontation Clause.  The District Court rejected Adamson‟s 
argument that “the presence of a limiting instruction is 
essential to the constitutionality of a Street-type submission 
of evidence.”  (App. at 27.)  Since Adamson failed to request 
                                              
2
 Adamson also challenged his sentence; however, that 
issue was not included in the certificate of appealability in 
this case and is therefore not before us.   
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such an instruction at trial, the Court reduced his argument to 
“a claim that it would be desirable for the trial judge to drive 
home the non-hearsay purpose of [the] prosecutorial 
examination further … .”  (Id. at 29.)  However, said the 
Court, “the fact that the instructions could have been better 
does not render them unconstitutional.”  (Id.)  Accordingly, 
the District Court concluded that the Appellate Division‟s 
ruling was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application 
of Supreme Court precedent.   
 
 Having rejected all of Adamson‟s arguments, the 
District Court denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
and also denied a certificate of appealability.  Adamson 
timely sought a certificate of appealability from us.  We 
granted him one “with respect to [his] claim that his Sixth 
Amendment right to confront his accusers was violated by the 
prosecution‟s introduction of his co-defendants‟ statements 
during his trial.”   
 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over Adamson‟s 
petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  We have appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.  The 
District Court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing, so our 
standard of review is plenary.  See McMullen v. Tennis, 562 
F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Because the District Court 
ruled on the petition without conducting an evidentiary 
hearing, this Court conducts a plenary review.”). 
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 Adamson‟s confrontation claim was adjudicated on the 
merits and exhausted in State court proceedings,
3
 and we are 
thus bound by the standards of the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”).  See Harris 
v. Ricci, 607 F.3d 92, 96 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Because this case 
arises from a state court proceeding in which the merits of 
[petitioner‟s] sole claim on appeal were adjudicated, the 
standards established by [AEDPA] apply.”).4  Under AEDPA, 
a federal court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus with 
respect to a claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state 
court proceedings unless the state court‟s adjudication 
“resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”  
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).  “[C]learly established law as 
determined by [the Supreme] Court „refers to the holdings, as 
opposed to the dicta, of th[e] Court‟s decisions as of the time 
of the relevant state-court decision.‟”  Yarborough v. 
Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 660-61 (2004) (quoting Williams, 
529 U.S. at 412).  Here, the Appellate Division‟s October 5, 
2000 decision on the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause 
issue is the relevant state ruling.  See Newland v. Hall, 527 
                                              
3
 Adamson did not raise any Confrontation Clause issues 
in his post-conviction petitions to the New Jersey state courts.  
“A petitioner who has raised an issue on direct appeal, 
however, is not required to raise it again in a state post-
conviction proceeding.”  Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 
513 (3d Cir. 1997). 
4
 Adamson filed his federal habeas petition after 
AEDPA‟s effective date, so the statute applies to his case.  
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 429 (2000). 
14 
 
F.3d 1162, 1199 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he highest state court 
decision reaching the merits of a habeas petitioner‟s claim is 
the relevant state court decision.”).   
 
 As AEDPA makes clear, only if the Appellate 
Division‟s decision was “contrary to” or an “unreasonable 
application of” the governing Sixth Amendment legal 
principles, as established by the Supreme Court, can 
Adamson gain habeas relief.  The Supreme Court has 
afforded independent meaning to the words “contrary to” and 
“unreasonable application of [law].”5  Williams, 529 U.S. at 
405.  “Contrary to” means “diametrically different,” 
“opposite in character or nature,” or “mutually opposed.”  Id.  
The “contrary to” prong of AEDPA applies when “the state 
court reaches a conclusion opposite to the Supreme Court‟s 
own conclusion on a question of law or decides the case 
differently where the Supreme Court was confronted by a set 
of materially indistinguishable facts.”  McMullen, 562 F.3d at 
236.  “A state-court decision will certainly be contrary to [the 
Supreme Court‟s] clearly established precedent if the state 
court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set 
                                              
5
 In giving separate effect to both the “contrary to” and 
“unreasonable application” prongs of § 2254(d)(1), the 
Supreme Court has had to eschew some measure of the 
ordinary meaning of those words.  It would seem that when a 
state court‟s analysis of a prisoner‟s constitutional claim is 
contrary to Supreme Court precedent, it is necessarily also an 
unreasonable application of the law.  But, under Williams, 
“contrary to” is not a subset of “unreasonable application,” 
and we follow the now well-established definitions provided 
in that case, 529 U.S. at 405. 
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forth in [the Supreme Court‟s] cases.”  Williams, 529 U.S. at 
405.  
 
 The “unreasonable application” prong of AEDPA 
applies when a “state court identifies the correct governing 
legal principle from [the Supreme] Court‟s decisions but 
unreasonably applies that principle to the facts.”  Wiggins v. 
Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003) (quotations omitted).  That 
test is an objective one and does not permit a court to grant 
relief simply because the state court might have incorrectly 
applied federal law to the facts of a certain case.  Id. at 520-
21.   
 
 Even if we find constitutional error in the state court‟s 
decision, we must determine if that error was harmless or if it 
instead “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in 
determining the jury‟s verdict.”  Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 
U.S. 619, 637 (1993); see also Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 
121 (2007) (“We hold that in § 2254 proceedings a court must 
assess the prejudicial impact of constitutional error in a state-
court criminal trial under the „substantial and injurious effect‟ 
standard set forth in Brecht … .”).  Only in the latter event 
will we grant habeas relief. 
 
III. Discussion  
 
 Our conclusion is that the presentation at Adamson‟s 
trial of portions of his accomplices‟ incriminating statements, 
without a limiting instruction, was contrary to the Supreme 
Court‟s clearly established precedent in Street, which 
required such an instruction.  We further conclude that the 
accomplice statements, combined with the lack of a limiting 
instruction, had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury‟s 
16 
 
verdict.  Adamson‟s habeas petition is therefore well-
founded. 
 
 A.  The Appellate Division‟s Opinion Was 
Contrary to Clearly Established Supreme Court 
Precedent 
 
 The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, 
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, 
requires that a criminal defendant be given the right “to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him,” and includes the 
right to cross-examine those witnesses.  U.S. CONST. amends 
VI, XIV; see Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987).  
At the time the Appellate Division issued its opinion, 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence permitted testimonial 
hearsay to be admitted against a defendant, provided it bore 
sufficient “indicia of reliability.”6  See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 
U.S. 56, 66 (1980).  Furthermore, clearly established Supreme 
Court law guided lower courts as to when and how 
confessions of co-conspirators could be introduced at trial in a 
manner that did not offend the Confrontation Clause.  See 
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 136-37 (1968) 
(holding that the admission of a pretrial confession of a 
                                              
6
 With the Supreme Court‟s decision in Crawford v. 
Washington, that has changed.  541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004) 
(prohibiting “admission of testimonial statements of a witness 
who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to 
testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for 
cross-examination”).  Even after Crawford, however, “[t]he 
[Confrontation] Clause ... does not bar the use of testimonial 
statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the 
matter asserted.” Id. at 59 (citing Street, 471 U.S. at 414). 
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nontestifying co-defendant that incriminates the defendant 
violates that defendant‟s right to confront witnesses even if a 
limiting instruction is given); see also Richardson, 481 U.S. 
at 203 & 211 (permitting admission of the confession of a 
non-testifying co-defendant which was “redacted to omit all 
reference to [the defendant]” when the jury was instructed to 
use the information only against the non-testifying 
defendant).    
 
 In Street, the Supreme Court addressed whether 
introduction of a co-conspirator‟s confession at trial for an 
impeachment purpose offends the Confrontation Clause.  
Harvey Street and an accomplice were arrested for burglary 
and murder.  471 U.S. at 411.  After their arrests, both men 
confessed to a Sheriff.  Id.  At trial, Street repudiated his 
confession and asserted that the Sheriff read him his 
accomplice‟s confession and “directed him to say the same 
thing.”  Id.  To rebut Street‟s claim that his confession was 
fabricated, the State had the Sheriff read to the jury the 
accomplice‟s confession, which directly implicated Street.  
Id. at 411-12.  Before the Sheriff read the accomplice‟s 
statement to the jury, however, “the trial judge twice 
informed the jury that it was admitted „not for the purpose of 
proving the truthfulness of his statement, but for the purpose 
of rebuttal only.‟”  Id. at 412.  The trial court included a 
similar limiting instruction in its final instructions to the jury.  
Id. 
 
 The Supreme Court concluded that “[t]he nonhearsay 
aspect of [the co-conspirator‟s] confession – not to prove 
what happened at the murder scene but to prove what 
happened when [the defendant] confessed – raise[d] no 
Confrontation Clause concerns. ”  Id. at 414 (emphasis in 
18 
 
original).   Instead, the concern was that the jury might use 
the co-conspirator‟s statement in a manner inconsistent with 
the Confrontation Clause, i.e., to infer Street‟s guilt even 
though Street had had no opportunity to cross-examine the 
witness.  Id.  But, the Court found no such problem in Street‟s 
case, “hold[ing] that the trial judge‟s instructions were the 
appropriate way to limit the jury‟s use of [the co-conspirator‟s 
confession] in a manner consistent with the Confrontation 
Clause.”  Id. at 417.   
 
 Street is one application of the general, long-standing 
principle that the potential for jury misuse of evidence can 
often be curbed by a limiting instruction.  Indeed, whenever 
the Supreme Court has permitted a jury to consider evidence 
that has the potential to be misused, e.g., to be considered in a 
way that would violate the defendant‟s constitutional rights, it 
has required that a proper jury instruction be given to avoid 
the misuse.  See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 
(1971) (holding that statements elicited from a defendant in 
violation of his Miranda rights could be introduced to 
impeach that defendant‟s credibility when the jury was 
instructed that the statements were not to be considered as 
evidence of his guilt); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-61 
(1967) (holding that evidence of a defendant‟s prior criminal 
convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence 
enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence 
could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt); 
Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64 (1954) (holding that 
the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was 
admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could 
be considered only in assessing a defendant‟s credibility and 
not for determining guilt); cf. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 
341, 347 (1981) (condoning the admission of erroneously 
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admitted eyewitness identification evidence when the jury 
was instructed not to consider it, regardless of the dissent‟s 
observation that such evidence “has a powerful impact on 
juries”).    
 
 These precedents are premised on the belief that juries 
follow the instructions they are given.  See Richardson, 481 
U.S. at 211 (“The rule that juries are presumed to follow their 
instructions is a pragmatic one, rooted less in the absolute 
certitude that the presumption is true than in the belief that it 
represents a reasonable practical accommodation of the 
interests of the state and the defendant in the criminal justice 
process.”).  In the Confrontation Clause context, however, the 
Supreme Court has recognized that the risk of prejudice 
stemming from the introduction of a co-defendant‟s 
confession is so high that, in some circumstances, even a 
limiting instruction cannot cure the constitutional problem.  
See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 136 (“[T]here are some contexts in 
which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow 
instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so 
vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations 
of the jury system cannot be ignored.”); see also Gray v. 
Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 196 (1998) (holding that a properly 
instructed jury may not consider the redacted confession of a 
co-defendant which “obviously refer[ed] directly to someone, 
often obviously the defendant”).  It is only when a co-
defendant‟s statement can be redacted so that it does not at all 
implicate the defendant that admission of the statement can be 
justified, and then only when an instruction is given limiting 
consideration of the statement to whether the co-defendant is 
guilty.  Richardson, 481 U.S. at 211; see also Cruz v. New 
York, 481 U.S. 186, 193 (1987) (“We hold that, where a 
nontestifying codefendant‟s confession incriminating the 
20 
 
defendant is not directly admissible against the defendant, ... 
the Confrontation Clause bars its admission at their joint trial, 
even if the jury is instructed not to consider it against the 
defendant, and even if the defendant‟s own confession is 
admitted against him.” (internal citation omitted)).  It is 
therefore not surprising that Street requires a limiting 
instruction to preserve the Sixth Amendment Confrontation 
Clause rights of a defendant when a jury is permitted to 
consider for impeachment value a nontestifying accomplice‟s 
statement that incriminates the defendant.   
 
 The Appellate Division correctly identified Street as 
the governing rule but held that there was no Confrontation 
Clause problem simply because the prosecutor had 
emphasized the impeachment purposes of the problematic 
statements.
7
  But Street makes clear that a jury‟s 
understanding of the distinction between substantive and 
impeachment uses of inculpatory evidence cannot be taken 
for granted.  An appropriate limiting instruction is necessary 
to prohibit jury misuse of such evidence.  Of particular 
importance here, the presence of such an instruction was 
                                              
7
 For reasons unclear to us, Adamson argues that his case 
is factually distinguishable from Street, contending that the 
accomplice statements did not actually impeach his testimony 
and that they are far less probative than the statement at issue 
in Street.  We agree with the District Court that, other than 
the absence of a limiting instruction, the facts of this case are 
indistinguishable from Street in any material way.  That the 
accomplice statements were admitted during Adamson‟s 
testimony, instead of Cirelli‟s or another officer‟s testimony, 
does not change our conclusion. 
21 
 
essential to the holding in Street.
8
  471 U.S. at 417 (“[W]e 
hold that the trial judge‟s instructions were the appropriate 
way to limit the jury‟s use of [the co-conspirator‟s 
confession] in a manner consistent with the Confrontation 
                                              
8
 Nonhearsay use of statements generally raises no 
Confrontation Clause concerns.  United States v. Jimenez, 513 
F.3d 62, 81 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Nonhearsay use of evidence as a 
means of demonstrating a discrepancy does not implicate the 
Confrontation Clause.”); United States v. Hinton, 423 F.3d 
355, 358 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005) (“As we held in United States v. 
Trala, testimonial statements are admissible without prior 
cross examination if they are not offered for their truth.”).  
But we and our sister circuits have acknowledged Street‟s 
teaching that a limiting instruction is necessary where, as 
here, nonhearsay use is made of expressly incriminating 
statements.  See United States v. Trala, 386 F.3d 536, 544 (3d 
Cir. 2004) (noting the importance of the limiting instruction 
in Street), vacated on other grounds, 546 U.S. 1086 (2006); 
see also Ray v. Boatwright, 592 F.3d 793, 797 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(finding confrontation clause violation when co-actors‟ 
statements were introduced into evidence in prosecution‟s 
case-in-chief, as opposed to on rebuttal, and no limiting 
instruction was given); Furr v. Brady, 440 F.3d 34, 39 (1st 
Cir. 2006) (“[The Street Court] noted that, absent other 
circumstances, it is sufficient that the codefendant statement 
is nonhearsay – viz., not admitted for the truth of the matter 
asserted, and [that] the court gives a limiting jury instruction 
to that effect.”); Lee v. McCaughtry, 892 F.2d 1318, 1325-26 
(7th Cir. 1990) (rejecting confrontation clause challenge 
when out of court statements were played for the jury and the 
trial court gave a limiting instruction at the time the 
statements were introduced). 
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Clause.”).  The fundamental problem with the Appellate 
Division‟s opinion is that it divorces Street‟s conclusion that 
the Confrontation Clause permits use of a co-defendant‟s 
confession for impeachment purposes from its corresponding 
requirement that, in such circumstances, the jury must be 
instructed to consider the confession for impeachment only.   
 
 The Appellate Division correctly observed that, when 
weighing Adamson‟s trial testimony, the jury should have 
been instructed to consider the accomplice statements solely 
for their impeachment value.  However, the Appellate 
Division held that the trial court‟s failure to give such an 
instruction was not plain error, suggesting that a limiting 
instruction, though preferred, is optional from a constitutional 
standpoint.  We are compelled to disagree.  The failure to 
instruct the jury regarding the proper use of the accomplice 
statements, statements which facially incriminated Adamson, 
was plain and obvious error that was directly contrary to 
Street‟s holding.  Without a limiting instruction to guide it, 
the jury that found Adamson guilty was free to consider those 
facially incriminating statements as substantive evidence of 
Adamson‟s guilt.  The careful and crucial distinction the 
Supreme Court made between an impeachment use of the 
evidence and a substantive use of it on the question of guilt 
was completely ignored during the trial.  Adamson‟s 
constitutional right to confront witnesses was therefore 
violated by the presentation at trial of portions of the 
accomplice statements.  The Appellate Division‟s opposite 
conclusion was contrary to clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court. 
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 B. Adamson was Prejudiced by the Violation of  
  His Confrontation Rights 
 
 Having concluded that the Appellate Division‟s 
decision was contrary to clearly established Federal law, we 
must consider whether the constitutional error which it 
perpetuated – the unrestricted introduction of non-testifying 
accomplice statements – was harmless or whether it resulted 
in actual prejudice to Adamson.  See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 
(“[H]abeas petitioners ... are not entitled to habeas relief 
based on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in 
actual prejudice.” (Internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted)).  “[A]n error is harmless unless it had substantial 
and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury‟s 
verdict.”  Fry, 551 U.S. at 116 (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted).  If an error did have that kind of effect, 
then, by definition, it resulted in actual prejudice.  Our role is 
to ask whether we think the constitutional error “substantially 
influenced the jury‟s decision.”  O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 
U.S. 432, 436 (1995).  “If, when all is said and done, the 
[court‟s] conviction is sure that the error did not influence the 
jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the 
judgment should stand.”  Id. at 437-38 (quoting Kotteakos v. 
United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1946)) (alteration in 
original).  But if we have “grave doubt” about whether the 
error had substantial and injurious effect or influence in 
determining the jury‟s verdict, we must conclude that the 
error was not harmless.  Id. at 438.  The Supreme Court has 
cautioned that “The uncertain judge should treat the error, not 
as if it were harmless, but as if it affected the verdict (i.e., as 
if it had a „substantial and injurious effect or influence in 
determining the jury‟s verdict‟).”  Id.   
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 We do have such doubt about the error in this case.  
Though we do not do so lightly,
9
 we must disagree with the 
State‟s contention that Adamson was not prejudiced by the 
absence of a limiting instruction because he failed to request 
the limiting instruction and because the evidence against him 
was “overwhelming.”  (Appellees‟ Ans. Br. at 15.)  
 
 First, as a practical matter, we do not see how 
Adamson‟s failure to request the limiting instruction means 
that he was not prejudiced.  It may raise questions about the 
effectiveness of his counsel,
10
 but it does not alter the effect 
that the lack of a limiting instruction may have had on the 
jury‟s verdict.11  
                                              
9
 “We emphasize that because of the deference and respect 
that we give the … state courts, not only because of the 
requirements of AEDPA but in general, we reach our result 
reluctantly.”  Vazquez v. Wilson, 550 F.3d 270, 281 (3d Cir. 
2008).  
10
 We are not inclined to accept the State‟s position, raised 
at oral argument, that the failure to request a limiting 
instruction could have been a strategic choice by the defense.  
The advantage to the defense of having such incriminating 
evidence admitted and repeatedly referenced without a 
limiting instruction is far from apparent.  Furthermore, the 
State‟s suggestion that Adamson‟s counsel made a strategic 
decision to avoid drawing the jury‟s attention to the 
accomplice statements strains credulity since those statements 
comprised the essence of the State‟s rebuttal to Adamson‟s 
defense and were specifically brought to the jury‟s attention 
in the State‟s closing.  
11
 The State cites Albrecht v. Horn, arguing that 
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 Second, most of the “overwhelming” evidence the 
State points to concerns the robbery itself.  The State notes 
that patrons of the pool hall said a robbery occurred, guns and 
dog repellant were recovered at or near the robbery scene, and 
the responding officer discovered evidence of the crime left 
by a suspect fleeing the scene, all of which is true but does 
nothing to incriminate Adamson.  The State‟s case against 
Adamson rested on his own confession, which he claimed 
was fabricated, and on the accomplice statements, which 
directly implicated him in the robbery.  Without looking to 
the accomplice statements for their truth, we cannot say that 
the evidence against Adamson, i.e., his confession alone, was 
so overwhelming as to make the unrestricted admission of the 
                                                                                                     
Adamson‟s failure to object to the admission of the 
accomplice statements mandates that we review for plain 
error and determine if the lack of a limiting instruction 
“infected the entire trial with unfairness.”  485 F.3d 103, 129 
(3d Cir. 2007).  Albrecht involved a due process challenge to 
the lack of a limiting instruction for the use of prior bad acts 
evidence as propensity evidence.  Here, Adamson does not 
expressly challenge his conviction on due process grounds.  
We note, however, that the requirements for plain error are 
met: an obvious error was committed, it affected Adamson‟s 
substantial right to confront witnesses against him, and it 
seriously affected the fairness of his trial.  See United States 
v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 192 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that 
plain error exists when (1) an error was committed (2) that 
was plain, (3) that affected the defendant‟s substantial rights, 
and (4) Error! Main Document Only.the error seriously 
affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings). 
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accomplice statements of little moment.  There were no 
eyewitness statements identifying Adamson as taking part in 
the robbery, nor was there any physical evidence tying him to 
the robbery.  Cf. Bond v. Beard, 539 F.3d 256, 276 (3d Cir. 
2008) (holding harmless the admission of a nontestifying co-
defendant‟s confession in violation of the Confrontation 
Clause when there was extensive evidence of the defendant‟s 
guilt, including the defendant‟s allegedly coerced confession 
and an eyewitness who testified that he was “absolutely 
certain” that the defendant committed the crime).  
 
 We do not suggest that, had there been no error, the 
evidence would have been insufficient to sustain a conviction.  
As the Appellate Division noted, the issue of Adamson‟s 
credibility was certainly before the jurors, and they could 
have convicted Adamson because they did not believe the 
claim that his confession was fabricated or coerced.  Indeed, 
the jury could have arrived at that conclusion by using the 
accomplice statements for permissible impeachment 
purposes. We also note that the prosecutor‟s use of the 
statements for their impeachment value was permissible and 
mitigates the possibility that the jury considered the substance 
of the statements for their truth.
12
  See Street, 471 U.S. at 417.   
                                              
12
 In closing, the prosecutor argued to the jurors that the 
discrepancies among the statements reflected that Adamson 
was lying.  Even though the trial court did not limit the use of 
Napier‟s and Aljamaar‟s statements, the jury was, 
nevertheless, being urged to use them for impeachment 
purposes only.  At no point did the prosecutor or the court 
suggest that the jury should use Napier‟s and Aljamaar‟s 
statements for their truth in order to establish Adamson‟s 
guilt. 
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 Nevertheless, given the strong potential for an 
accomplice‟s confession that implicates the defendant to 
unfairly infect the trial if considered as substantive evidence 
of guilt, and given the lack of otherwise overwhelming 
evidence of guilt, we have serious concerns that the verdict 
was substantially influenced by the constitutional error.  It is 
only natural that a juror, upon hearing the out-of-court 
statements from two admitted participants in the robbery 
saying that Adamson was involved, would consider those 
statements in assessing guilt, unless instructed otherwise.  Cf. 
Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135-36 (describing “extrajudicial 
statements of a codefendant” as “devastating to the 
defendant”); see also Vazquez v. Wilson, 550 F.3d 270, 280 
(3d Cir. 2008) (recognizing “the chance that the jury will 
credit [a nontestifying codefendant‟s incriminating statement] 
and conclude that the statement pointed to the objecting 
defendant as the offender even though he could not cross-
examine the declarant”).  Accordingly, we hold that the error 
was not harmless and that Adamson is entitled to the relief he 
seeks.
 13
  
                                              
13
 We recognize that there is some academic discussion 
about the continued propriety of federal habeas relief in 
noncapital cases to correct case-specific errors.  See, e.g., 
Joseph L. Hoffman & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal 
Role in State Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 793 & 
818 (2009) (arguing that federal habeas is necessary to correct 
“structural and systemic” constitutional problems and that “as 
a means of correcting or deterring routine, case-specific 
constitutional errors, habeas is completely ineffectual in all 
but capital cases” so federal resources should be redeployed 
to reform the “state systems of defense representation” and 
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 IV. Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons we will reverse the District 
Court‟s denial of Adamson‟s petition, and will remand the 
case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
Specifically, the District Court should order that the New 
Jersey authorities free Adamson from custody unless he is 
retried in the state courts within a reasonable period of time. 
                                                                                                     
“help prevent constitutional violations from occurring in the 
first place”).  We must leave to others the debate over the 
place that habeas relief should have in our justice system.  
The law as it now stands requires us to correct errors of 
constitutional magnitude, case by case, as we do here.    
